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The Affect of Animal Gender on Fed Cattle Producer Marketing Behavior 
Abstract:  
  Weekly grid market share by volume for slaughter steers is compared to slaughter heifers. 
Summary statistics indicate average grid market share for steers (42%) is 27% higher than 
slaughter heifers (33%). The literature indicates that pregnancy and increased dark cutter 
incidence associated with heifers relative to steers creates additional financial risk when heifers 
are sold on a grid.  Econometric analysis suggests grid market share is less sensitive to changes 
in market conditions for heifers relative to steers. The empirical evidence is consistent with the 
supposition that marketing heifers is riskier than marketing steers on a grid.  Thus sellers need 
stronger economic incentives to market heifers on a grid relative to steers.   
 
Introduction: 
The issue of a gender effect on feeder and fat cattle production performance and prices 
has been a popular topic in both the animal science and agricultural economics literature.   The 
animal science literature has investigated how gender affects animal feedlot production 
performance and finished carcass characteristics; i.e., average daily gain (ADG), marbling, yield 
grade (YG), etc., (e.g. Choat et al. 2006; Zinn et al. 2008). The “gender effect” analysis reported 
in the agricultural economics literature has investigated the effect of gender on price, revenue, 
and profit at both the feedlot and feeder stages of production (e.g. Schultz and Marsh 1985; 
Faminow, de Matos, and Richmond 1996).  However, the effect of animal gender on producers’ 
marketing channel and pricing method decisions has been overlooked in the agricultural 
economics literature.  3 
 
Fed cattle marketing-channel studies have focused on how the introduction of new 
alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) for steer and heifer slaughter has affected fed cattle 
price, market share volume across AMAs, packers’ margins, etc. (e.g., RTI International 2007; 
Koontz and Lawrence 2010).  The growth in the use of AMAs by fed cattle producers parallels 
the beef industry’s Value Based Marketing (VBM) initiative. The goal of the VBM initiative is 
to improve production efficiency and quality (e.g. Fausti et al. 1998). A key component of the 
VBM initiative was the introduction of grid pricing in the mid-1990s. The growth in the market 
share of AMA slaughter volume is positively correlated with the growth in market share of fed 
cattle sold on a grid pricing system.   
The issue of an AMA gender affect was first discussed by Lange (2009). Lange adopted 
an approach developed by Fausti et al. (2008 and 2010) to estimate individual weekly AMA 
market share for steer slaughter volume.  Lange investigated the issue of selling slaughter steers 
versus selling slaughter heifers on a grid.  He used USDA-AMS weekly reported data for the 
period from April 11, 2004 to January 11, 2009.  Lange reported that, on average, 41.58% of 
slaughter steers where sold on a grid pricing system versus 33.20% of slaughter heifers.  Lange’s 
results indicate that producers have a stronger propensity to sell their slaughter steers on a grid 
relative to their slaughter heifers.   
The animal science literature indicates carcass quality is affected by gender. The 
agricultural economics literature documents that gender does affect price. However, these 
reported differences do not explain the magnitude of the grid market share disparity across 
gender reported by Lange.  The question of interest addressed in this study is: Why are producers 
more inclined to market their slaughter heifers at an average price in the cash market relative to 
their slaughter steers?    4 
 
Our objective is to extend Lange’s data set and re-estimate AMA weekly market share for 
steer and heifer grid slaughter volume. A seemingly unrelated regression procedure (SUR) is 
employed to investigate the potential market influences that can explain this gender disparity.  
Slaughter Steer and Heifer Price and Carcass Quality Differences  
The animal science literature provides strong empirical evidence that steer feedlot 
performance in the areas of ADG, feed efficiency (FE), and mature body weight (BW), on 
average, is superior to heifer feedlot performance (e.g. Zinn et al. 2008).  On the issue of finished 
carcass quality, the literature indicates that slaughter heifers have superior carcass marbling and 
receive, on average, a higher USDA quality grade than slaughter steers. According to Tatum, 
Gruber, and Schneider (2007: p. 3), the empirical evidence indicates that “Despite the fact that 
heifers typically produce carcasses with higher marbling scores and more desirable USDA 
quality grades, product tenderness usually favors steers.…” However, on average slaughter 
heifer hot carcass weights are lower relative to slaughter steers (Choat et al. 2006).   
In a study published by Certified Angus Beef 
TM (CAB) based on data for approximately 
19.8 million carcasses (marketed from 1999 to 2005), Corah and McCully (2006) reported that 
the percentage of heifers and steers grading prime or choice declined from 58% to 54% and 48% 
to 44%, respectively.  The data indicates that average heifer quality grade, for this time period, 
was superior for CAB program qualifying slaughter cattle.  
The animal science literature has also looked at the issue of undiscovered pregnant 
heifers being finished and the issue of heifers having a higher propensity for being classified as a 
dark cutter during USDA carcass grading (Scanga et al. 1998). Both of these heifer carcass 
issues are financial risk factors for the producer when selling on a grid. The economic risk of 
pregnant slaughter heifers (Buhman, Hungerford, and Smith 2003) and the relationship between 5 
 
heifer and dark cutter incidence rate (Kreikemeier and Unruh 1993) affects the live weight price 
differential between steers and heifers. 
Schultz and Marsh (1985) discuss the perceived price differential between slaughter 
steers and heifers.  They discuss the likely reasons for this perception: a) lighter finishing 
weights for heifers and b) random factors such as packer gender preferences.   Schultz and Marsh 
(p. 85) report that they find no statistical evidence that the “finished steer minus finished heifer 
price differential” is present using U.S. quarterly data (Table 4: insignificant intercept 
coefficient). Schultz and Marsh (p. 88) also report that an increase in wholesale steer carcass 
price does increase the finished steer-heifer price differential. However, for the finished steer-
heifer price differential they conclude that “…random factors still explain the greatest proportion 
of the variation in the dependent variable.”   
Faminow, de Matos, and Richmond (1996) investigate if a gender bias exists when 
selling fed steers and heifers live weight versus their actual carcass value (the market value of 
cut, trim, and waste) to a packer in the Canadian market.  Their empirical findings indicate that 
steers sold live weight were over paid their market value with respect to actual carcass value.  
Heifers sold live weight, however, were under paid the market value of their actual carcass value.  
The reported findings in the Canadian study suggest that there is a price bias when heifers are 
sold live weight at an average price per pen versus slaughter steers.     
The Canadian study suggests the perceived negative price bias toward slaughter heifers 
investigated by Schultz and Marsh may have some validity even though the later study failed to 
find significant evidence of a price differential.  The issue of an increased discount risk 
associated with slaughter heifers due to pregnancy or heifers having a higher incidence of being 
discounted as a dark cutter were not considered in the Canadian study.
1  Both of these carcass 6 
 
quality issues imply additional financial risk for the packer when they purchase heifers by the 
pen at a live weight price. In turn, these financial risks increase the seller’s propensity to market 
finished heifers at a live weight price by the pen.   
The issue of increased uncertainty concerning heifer carcass quality relative to slaughter 
steer carcass quality implies heifers have a greater financial risk associated with selling on a grid. 
The issue of cattle carcass quality risk associated with marketing slaughter cattle was formalized 
in paper by Fausti and Feuz (1995).  Fausti and Feuz demonstrated that packers would charge 
feedlots a risk premium when purchasing cattle live weight at an average price relative to 
purchasing them on a grid.  The risk premium represents compensation to the packer for 
undertaking the risk of purchasing cattle without knowing the carcass quality with certainty at 
the time of purchase.  Fausti and Feuz also argued that the existence of incomplete information 
about carcass quality on the part of sellers of slaughter cattle created a demand by sellers for the 
three live cattle marketing alternatives: live weight, dressed weight, and grid. The demand for 
alternative marketing alternatives is the result of risk preferences varying across sellers of 
slaughter cattle.  
Carcass Quality and Marketing Risk 
Selling cattle on a grid determines the actual market value of the animal being sold. The 
per head price differential, discussed in the literature, is derived by comparing the estimated grid 
market value of an animal to the estimated market value if the animal was marketed live weight 
or dressed weight.  The grid pricing literature suggests that the grid price differential can be 
positive or negative, and depends on seasonality, carcass quality, marketing location, etc., (Fausti 
et al. 2010).  The uncertainty associated with the sign of the grid price differential and seller risk 7 
 
aversion appear to be plausible explanations for not only the existence of multiple AMAs but 
also why AMA market share of weekly slaughter volume fluctuates over time.    
Let’s assume a seller of fed cattle has a pen of finished heifers and a pen of finished 
steers.   The seller has a choice to sell each pen live weight at an average price based on 
observable live animal characteristics for that pen (breed, body condition, animal temperament, 
uniformity, etc.).  The other alternative is to sell the cattle on a grid where each animal will be 
evaluated to determine its exact market value based on USDA yield grade, quality grade, hot 
carcass weight, and the presence of any out-carcass characteristics (hard-bone, dark cutter, etc.).  
Fausti and Feuz (1995) demonstrated that a buyer of fed cattle (meatpacker) faced with 
conducting a transaction with a seller of fed cattle would view purchasing cattle at a live weight 
price as a risky transaction with respect to carcass quality uncertainty. Whereas, purchasing 
cattle on a grid would be a riskless transaction. Furthermore, Fausti and Feuz’s “Theory of 
Factor Price Disparity” suggests that even if the meatpacking firm was risk neutral, it would still 
charge the seller of fed cattle a risk premium (due to carcass quality uncertainty) if it is a pen 
level transaction at an average price.  
Assume the seller’s marketing channel selection decision is influenced by their 
preference for risk.  Let us further assume that sellers are risk averse, and are able to negotiate 
with packers a live weight price that reflects the sellers ex ante expectation of the average carcass 
quality of the cattle they are selling. If the seller decides to sell his/her cattle by the pen at a live 
weight price (PL), then the price per hundred weight is known with certainty. If the seller selects 
to market the cattle on a grid then there is uncertainty about the final price per hundred weight. 
There is a positive probability (γ) that the average grid price per hundred weight will be lower 
than the live weight price due to unexpected negative carcass characteristics that resulted in the 8 
 
levying of discounts.  If this should occur, then the seller’s average per head price will be P1. 
However, there is also a positive probability (1-γ) that the average grid price per hundred weight 
will be higher than the live weight price due to unexpected positive carcass characteristics that 
resulted in the levying of unexpected premiums.  In this case the seller’s per head price will be 
P2, e.g., P2 > P1.  The expected value of the seller’s cattle marketed through a grid:  
1. E(PG)  = γP1 + (1-γ)P2.  
Again, for simplicity, we assume the E(PG) = PL. We will assume a univariate utility 
function U(Pi) that exhibits diminishing marginal utility with respect to price per hundred 
weight: dU/dPi >0, d
2U/dPi 
2 <0; were i= G or L.  Thus the seller has a concave utility function 
with respect to outcomes for the two marketing alternatives.  For the grid marketing alternative, 
the utility of expected value is:   
  2.  U[E(PG)] = U[γP1 + (1-γ)P2].  
The Expected Utility function for marketing on the grid is:  
3. E[U(PG)] = γU(P1 )+ (1-γ)U(P2).  
  According to the economics of uncertainty literature, for the risk averse seller: U[E(PG)] 
> E[U(PG)].  Given the assumption, E(PG)= PL, the risk averse seller requires a risk premium 
payment to sell on a grid even when the seller’s expectation is that the price per hundred weight 
sold live weight is equal to the grid equivalent.  If the premium is not large enough to overcome 
the seller’s aversion to risk, then the seller will market his/her cattle by the pen at an average 
price.  Risk and risk preference provides a plausible explanation for grid market share variability. 
  The agricultural economics literature has investigated the transmission of grid pricing 
market signals for carcass quality attributes.  The analysis by Johnson and Ward (2005 and 2006) 
on carcass quality price signals sent by grid pricing systems indicates that carcass weight 9 
 
accounts for 97% of the price signal for cattle sold at an average price by the pen.  For high 
carcass quality cattle sold on a grid, weight accounted for 79% of the market signal.  For lowest 
carcass quality cattle in their study, 50% of the market signal was explained by carcass weight.  
However, for both the high quality and the low quality cattle groups, grid discounts account for 
20% and 49.5% of the market signal, respectively.  Their findings indicate that grid premiums 
explain very little of the variability in carcass value regardless of carcass quality. They report 
that the choice/select discount and the yield grade 4 to 5 discount send the strongest signals 
through the grid pricing system. Based on their empirical findings, Johnson and Ward (2006: pp. 
88-89) make the following conclusion: “…under the current grid pricing structure, the weight 
incentive  and the availability of alternative marketing channels make increasing the weight of 
most lower valued cattle less risky and more lucrative endeavor than attempting to improve 
animal quality.”  
Methodology and Empirical Hypothesis  
  Following the work of Lange (2009), we have estimated weekly grid market share for 
slaughter steers and for slaughter heifers (Table 1).  The variability in weekly grid market shares 
is then investigated with respect to hypothesized market variables that have been identified as 
having a potential to influence seller marketing channel (AMA) selection.  
  We intend to investigate if the risk factors identified in the grid pricing literature can 
explain the variability in grid market share for slaughter steers and heifers.  Given the empirical 
evidence presented by Johnson and Ward, we assume that estimated animal weight and grid 
discounts are factors sellers of fed cattle evaluate when making the decision to market live 
weight at an average price or sell on a grid.  A system of equations, regressing weekly steer grid 10 
 
market share (stgridt) and heifer grid market share (hfgridt) on explanatory variables is defined 
below:  
4.   stgrid    a   a  stgrid     a  stgrid     a  lsteervol   a  lTREVsteer   
 a  ∆yg4dist     a  ∆seldist     a  ∆wtdist     a  spring   a  summer 
 a   fall   e    
5.hfgrid    b   b  hfgrid     b  hfgrid     b  lheifervol   b  lTREVheifer   
 b  ∆yg4dist     b  ∆seldist     b  ∆wtdist     b  spring   b  summer 
 b   fall   e    
  This is Zeller’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, and is estimated by 
generalized least square (GLS). The SUR model can take the contemporaneous correlation 
between     and     into account, and uses that cross-regression correlation to obtain more 
efficient estimates of the coefficients. Intuitively     and     are correlated because there are 
some common omitted factors that affect both         and         . The SUR model can be 
statistically justified by a nonzero correlation between the residuals of the two regressions.
  The explanatory variables selected are: lagged grid market share, quarterly seasonal 
dummy variables, choice/select discount (seldistt), the yield grade 4-5 discount (yg4distt),  the 
heavy weight discount (wtdistt >1000 lbs.), weekly steer and weekly heifer slaughter volume 
(e.g. Volt), and the weekly average live weight per head price for steers and heifers (e.g. TREV).    
Weekly steer and heifer volume are assumed to have an inverse relationship with gird market 
share due to influences of the cattle cycle, and inconsistent production by smaller feedlots. The 
issue of steer and heifer weight is accounted for by calculating the average market value per head 
(live weight price * live animal weight).  It is assumed, based on the Johnson and Ward papers, 
as average weekly live weight per head total revenue increases, the incentive to market on a grid 
declines, due to carcass quality uncertainty.   11 
 
  Another advantage of SUR model is that it allows for testing cross-regression restrictions. 
For example, one interesting hypothesis is   :        ; that is, the first lags of the dependent 
variables in the two regressions have the same coefficients. This approach is useful for 
comparing the short run dynamics. Notice that we use differenced variables, such as 
∆  4       , in the regressions whenever the ADF test indicates non-stationarity. The 
specification of the lag structure is guided by (i) the autocorrelation function (ACF), (ii) partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) and (iii) the assumption that the grid versus average price 
marketing decision is made thirty days prior to expected delivery.
2  We also calculated the 
pseudo R–square for the SUR model that basically measures the gain in the goodness-of-fit 
relative to the restricted SUR model that uses just intercept terms (see page 8.7.1 of Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005) for more discussion about the pseudo R–square).  
Data 
  The sources of the data used in this study are the USDA-AMS weekly reports (2004-
2010); series LM_CT154 and LM_CT151. The LM_CT154 (National Weekly Direct Slaughter 
Cattle) covers slaughtered cattle that were purchased using a negotiated price. Conversely, series 
LM_CT151 (National Daily Direct Slaughter Cattle – Formulated and Forward Contract 
Purchases – Domestic) reports the breakdown of non-negotiated purchases, both formulated and 
forward contract purchases. These reports include slaughter volume, dressing percentage, weight 
range, price range, and weighted average price.  Data on grid premiums and discounts was 
collected from USDA-AMS weekly reports: National Carcass Premiums and Discounts for 





  Table 1 provides the weekly averages for marketing channel (AMA) shares.  Consistent 
with the findings reported by Lange (2009), the data shows a definite propensity for heifers to be 
sold at an average price relative to steers. The magnitude of the market share differential 
suggests that the animal science and agricultural economics literature are correct in their view 
that sellers of finished heifers have a greater concern over the carcass quality of heifers relative 
to steers.  
The SUR regression results are presented in Table 2.  The regression diagnostics indicate 
that regression residuals (    and    ) are highly correlated (ρ=0.55) and provides strong support 
for the use of the SUR method.  McFadden’s R-squared (R
2= 0.45) was estimated as a measure 
of global fit, and it suggests the model explains about 70% of the variability in grid market 
share.
3  
Table 1. Grid Market Share, Averages for April 11, 2004 - May 2, 2010       
Description Steers Heifers 
Steers & 
Heifers
Negotiated Live & Dressed Wt. Cash Market Share  0.46 0.55    0.49
Negotiated Grid Net Cash Market Share  0.08 0.06    0.09
Cash Market Share  0.54 0.61    0.58
Forward Contract Market Share  0.06 0.08    0.07
Formula Pricing Net Market Share  0.40 0.31    0.36
Formula Pricing Grid Market Share  0.35 0.27    0.31
Forward Contract and Formula Market Share  0.46 0.39    0.42
All Grid Slaughter, Cash & Contract  0.42   0.33     0.39
    13 
 
  As discussed above, we also conducted Chi Square tests across steer and heifer regression 
coefficients.  The lagged dependent variable coefficients indicate a positive persistence in grid 
marketing. If grid marketing by producers is robust then there is persistence for it to remain 
robust.  If grid marketing by producers is weak then there is persistence for it to remain weak.  
This persistence in marketing behavior is stronger for steers than heifers.  This is indicated by a 
more robust lag 3 dependent variable for steers relative to heifers. The Chi Sq. test (p<0.05) 
indicates that past steer grid market share has a stronger influences on current steer grid market 
share relative to the heifer SUR estimates.  
  There does appear to be a seasonal pattern to both steer and heifer grid market share. 
SUR estimates indicate a higher grid market share in the summer and fall for steers but only in 
the summer for heifers. The Chi Sq. test (p<0.01) indicates that the seasonal steer grid market 
share pattern is different from heifers in the fall. 
  14 
 
Table 2: Estimates from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. 
   Dependent Variable:  Stgridt      
   Mean of Dependent Var.                        0.4238     
   Standard Error of Dependent Var.          0.0520     
   Standard Error of Estimate                     0.0387     
   Sum of Squared Residuals                      0.4662     
  
Durbin Watson Statistic                          2.1089 
    
  
Independent Variables:     Coefficient Std. Error  T-Stat.
   1. constant    3.3548 0.3527  9.5123
   2. stgridt-1 0.1787 0.0414  4.3120
   3. stgridt-3 0.2845 0.0418  6.8028
   4. lsteerVolt   -0.2044 0.0173  -11.7868
   5. lTREVsteert-4   -0.0906 0.0365  -2.4820
   6.  ∆yg4dist     -0.0014 0.0075 -0.1868
   7.  ∆seldist    -0.0023 0.0023  -0.9901
   8.  ∆wtdist    -0.0039 0.0027  -1.4081
   9.  spring    0.0019 0.0065  0.2975
   10.  summer    0.0386 0.0075  5.1429
   11.  fall    0.0308 0.0066  4.6366




Table 2:  Estimates from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (continued.)  
   Dependent Variable:  hfgridt      
   Mean of Dependent Var.                        0.3311       
   Standard Error of Dependent Var.         0.0507      
   Standard Error of Estimate                    0.0387     
   Sum of Squared Residuals                     0.4677    
   Durbin Watson Statistic                         1.9552     
   Independent Variables:     Coefficient Std. Error  T-Stat.
   12.  constant    2.5463 0.3207  7.9399
   13.  hfgrid    0.1986 0.0419  4.7408
   14.  hfgrid    0.1865 0.0419  4.4539
   15.  lhieferVolt   -0.1531 0.0149  -10.2932
   16.  lTREVheifert-4 -0.0796 0.0362  -2.1997
   17.  ∆yg4dist     -0.0019 0.0074 -0.2612
   18.  ∆seldist    -0.0026 0.0023  -1.1540
   19.  ∆wtdist    0.0015 0.0027  0.5425
   20.  spring    0.0011 0.0063  0.1751
   21.  summer    0.0346 0.0065  5.3277
   22.  fall      0.0083 0.0064  1.2986
SUR Global Fit: McFadden’s Pseudo R
2 = 0.4519   
 
  Steer and heifer slaughter volume were included in the model to determine if increased 
supply of fed cattle to the market influenced producer decisions to market on a grid or by the 
pen.  The SUR estimates indicate that increased slaughter volume has negative effect on both 
steer and heifer grid market share. Furthermore, the chi sq. test (p<0.01) indicates that producers 
decisions to market steers on a grid are more sensitive to fluctuations in steer slaughter volume 
than their decisions to market heifers on a grid. This may indicate that during periods of 
increased slaughter volume: a) the marginal increase in volume is coming from a segment of the 
feedlot industry that is more risk averse, or b) the marginal volume increase contains fed cattle 
entering the market with a greater level of carcass quality uncertainty.  
  The estimated coefficients for both the steer and heifer per-head live weight market value 
(PL*Live-weight) are negative and significant at less than 0.03.  This result supports our 16 
 
supposition that sellers of fed steers and heifers do switch marketing channels as market 
conditions change.  Producers selling cattle live weight increases as the market value of weight 
increases. This is not surprising given the findings reported by Johnson and Ward.  As average 
weight increases, sellers may view the risk of marketing on a grid as increasing given the bias 
toward discounts reported in the literature (e.g. Fausti et al 1998, Anderson and Zeuli 2001, 
Fausti and Qasmi 2002, Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006).  
  An interesting result is the failure of any of the gird discount variables to explain the 
variability in grid market share.  The implication of this failure could be due to the marginal 
marketing decision i.e., the seller’s decision to market live versus gird is made by deciding if the 
grid incentive structure is great enough to take on the financial risk of carcass quality uncertainty 
versus the financial certainty of adding additional pounds.  
Summary and Discussion 
  The results presented indicate that heifer grid market share is significantly lower than 
steer grid market share.  The SUR coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variables 
indicate a persistence to maintain positive or negative trends in grid market share for steers 
relative to heifers.   
  The SUR results, based on Chi Sq. tests, also indicate that steer grid market share has 
greater sensitivity to changes in market conditions relative heifer grid market share.  The 
sensitivity of steer grid market share to seasonality and slaughter volume fluctuations is greater 
relative to heifer grid market share.  The implication of heifer grid market share being less 
sensitive to changes in market conditions than steer grid market share is consistent with the 
supposition that marketing heifers on a grid is riskier than marketing steers on a grid.   
   17 
 
Footnotes: 
1.  The animal science literature has numerous articles on the tendency of slaughter 
heifers to have a higher percentage of dark cutter discounts than slaughter steers (Scanga et al. 
1998).  The National Cattlemen’s Association funded a study on the factors affecting slaughter 
heifer quality (Tatum, Gruber, and Schneider 2007) that examines factors that influence the 
heifer carcass dark cutter incidence and the effect on carcass value.  The 1991 National Beef 
Quality Audit found that approximately 2.7% of slaughter heifers were pregnant (Lorenzen et al. 
1993).  
2.   Grid marketing volume is approximately 80% formula sells.  This implies that at least 
a 30 day delivery contract has been agreed upon by the buyer and seller.  It is at this point (30 
days prior to delivery) that the feedlot has made the final decision to sell their cattle on a grid. At 
the time of this decision, sellers are assumed to evaluate market conditions (prices) and animal 
finishing performance and use this information to arrive at the decision to market on a grid.  To 
include this information we have included live weight average total revenue (weekly national 
average: live weight price times average live weight at slaughter) lagged four weeks to coincide 
with the 30 day delivery window.  Thus the 4 week lag is consistent with producer marketing 
decisions because most cattle marketed on a grid (our dependent variable) are sold on contract. A 
contract is defined as a commitment to sell at least 30 days prior to slaughter. Selling by the pen 
is the marketing alternative for marketing on the grid.  Thus, when the total revenue per head at 
the pen level of increases the marginal net benefit of putting on extra weight and selling by the 
pen will outweigh the marginal net benefit of selling fed cattle on a grid at a lighter weight.  We 
are assuming that total live weight revenue contains the information of the cost of putting on 
extra pounds of gain given that the live weight component contains the market information of 18 
 
marginal benefit of addition weight vs. the marginal cost of putting on the additional weight. The 
same logic is used to include grid premiums and discounts as explanatory variables. Higher 
premiums increase the incentive to market on a grid, higher discounts reduce the incentive.  
3. Veall and Zimmermann (1994: Table 2) estimated the approximate value of equivalent 
OLS R
2 associated with McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared.  They report the results from small 
sample (less than 200 obs.) simulations for estimating the OLS R
2 equivalent for the McFadden 
Pseudo R
2.  They estimate that for a McFadden R
2 = 0.45, the OLS R
2 equivalent has lower 
bound of 0.673 (McFadden R
2 = 0.40) and an upper bound of 0.78 (McFadden R
2 = 0.50).  A 
simple approximation of an OLS R
2 = 0.72 is our McFadden equivalent.   Our SUR model 
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